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Abstract 
In face of the increasing attention on issues of sustainability and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) by the general public and policy makers, companies have put growing emphasis on ensur-
ing CSR along their supply chains. Existent research has produced evidence that companies can 
increase their suppliers’ CSR engagement by exerting explicit pressure on them, e.g., through 
contractual clauses. Adding to this conventional chain of CSR enforcement, this paper conceptu-
alizes and empirically validates a so far undescribed extended chain of CSR enforcement that also 
leads to higher levels of a supplier firm’s CSR engagement irrespective and even in absence of 
explicit pressure by the customer firm. In particular, a customer firm’s CSR orientation in inter-
action with a powerful position in the supply chain leads suppliers to perceive pressure to engage 
in CSR regardless of factually exerted pressure. As a result, suppliers are likely to increase their 
CSR engagement in order to be customer oriented or in preemptive obedience. These results en-
tail substantial implications for policy makers as well as marketing academics and managers. 
 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility (CSR); CSR regulation; customer–supplier relation-
ship; power; stakeholder pressure.  
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Firms face various stakeholders’ expectations to ensure corporate social responsibility (CSR) en-
gagement along their supply chain (e.g., Pedersen and Andersen 2006). More specifically, aca-
demics and policy makers have discussed and implemented multiple measures (including regula-
tory measures) to ensure that firms take responsibility for their value chain (e.g., Campbell 2007; 
EU Commission 2014). As a result, many firms (voluntarily, preemptively, or reactively to exist-
ing soft or hard regulation) promote CSR of their suppliers upstream in the supply chain. Web 
Appendix W1 offers exemplary quotes of different firms in this respect. 
Prior research observed that firms are more likely to engage in CSR as a response to pressure 
from various stakeholders, such as pressure from policy makers, nongovernmental organizations, 
or associations (e.g., Aguilera et al. 2007; Campbell 2007). In line with firms’ emphasis on CSR 
engagement in their supply chains, many academic papers have focused on customer firms as 
particular stakeholder group, analyzing the effects of a customer firm’s pressure on a supplier 
firm’s CSR engagement. Research has demonstrated that, ceteris paribus, customer firms exert-
ing pressure on their suppliers to engage in CSR can trigger a series of effects, which we label 
the conventional chain of CSR enforcement in B2B supply chains (see Figure 1): Customer firms 
who are CSR-oriented are likely to exert pressure on their suppliers to engage in CSR (e.g., 
through contractual clauses), which in turn induces suppliers to perceive pressure to engage in 
CSR (e.g., Baden, Harwood, and Woodward 2009; González-Benito and González-Benito 2010). 
This perceived pressure increases the intention of supplier firms to engage in CSR and finally 
their CSR engagement (e.g., González-Benito and González-Benito 2006; Helmig, Spraul, and 
Ingenhoff 2013). A supplier’s CSR engagement then ultimately drives the supplier’s CSR repu-
tation with the customer (e.g., Homburg, Stierl, and Bornemann 2013). 
----- Insert Figure 1 about here ----- 
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To apply pressure along the conventional chain has also been the dominant mode of thinking 
about regulatory measures to increase CSR in supply chains (e.g., OECD guidance around “sup-
ply chain due diligence”; OECD 2016). However, this approach may have practical drawbacks 
for public policy makers and businesses. First, a customer firm’s capacity to impose pressure on 
its suppliers will be costly and finite. While CSR engagement can be coerced, it is usually the 
outcome of complex interactions between multiple actors, including customer firm, supplier 
firm, supplier firm’s own suppliers, and other stakeholders (e.g., Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 
2014). Companies like ABB, with 80,000 suppliers (ABB 2015), or Nestlé, dealing with almost 
700,000 farmer suppliers (Nestlé 2015), may find engaging in such complex interactions opera-
tionally infeasible or too costly—especially when acting in multi-national contexts in which poli-
cies vary from country to country. Such an increase in cost is not only against the interest of the 
firms, but also needs to be limited by policy makers: (a) transaction cost increases will harm par-
ticularly those companies that willingly engage in CSR and (b) cost increases will mostly affect 
firms that are operating within the policy maker’s own regulatory regime, potentially leading to a 
competitive cost disadvantage. 
Second, excessive pressure can yield undesired side-effects on the customer–supplier relation-
ship. High levels of customer pressure on a supplier may undermine the relationship (Dwyer, 
Schurr, and Oh 1987) and possibly result in counter-reactions (Baden, Harwood, and Woodward 
2009). In addition, higher levels of pressure may lead to customers’ attributing suppliers’ CSR 
engagement extrinsically, which lowers suppliers’ CSR reputation and decreases trust (Homburg, 
Stierl, and Bornemann 2013). These side-effects are neither in the interest of firms nor in the in-
terest of public policy making as they may lead to slower adoption of respective regulation. 
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Accordingly, our research aims to evaluate which additional mechanisms can lead to an increase 
in a supplier’s CSR engagement without costly overt pressure from customer firms. Building on 
the literature on stakeholder pressure, customer orientation, and power, we expect that the exer-
tion of explicit pressure is not a necessary condition for influencing a supplier’s CSR engage-
ment. Instead, we propose the existence of a so far undescribed extended chain of CSR enforce-
ment, according to which a customer’s CSR orientation is sufficient to increase a supplier’s CSR 
engagement in cases in which the customer has high power vis-à-vis the supplier. 
We conducted two studies that verified the existence of the extended chain of CSR enforcement. 
First, using cross-industry data of 200 customer–supplier dyads, we examined the interactive ef-
fect of customers’ CSR orientation and power on suppliers’ CSR engagement. Second, to delve 
into the mechanisms driving this effect, we conducted a scenario experiment with 173 managers. 
With these findings, our study makes important contributions to academic literature. First, we 
show a so far undescribed additional antecedent of CSR engagement in B2B supply chains. Sec-
ond, we show that organizations seem to extrapolate from their stakeholders’ characteristics to 
stakeholders’ expectations, leading to perceived pressure to conform if stakeholders are power-
ful. Third, we contribute to research on power in supply chains, as our study empirically con-
firms several factors that determine the distribution of power between customers and suppliers.  
Beyond contributing to academic marketing literature, our study provides actionable implications 
for policy makers and managerial practice. For policy makers, our analysis demonstrates that 
companies’ CSR engagement can be increased not only through the exertion of explicit pressure. 
This points to options of more focused policies, namely—amongst others—(a) focusing on in-
creasing CSR orientation of customer firms at the end of supply chains, (b) dominantly inviting 
large customer firms to make their CSR orientation public, and (c) paying attention to the role of 
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government and supra-national entities as (typically powerful) direct or indirect buyers from 
B2B supplier firms. For managerial practice, first, our results show that managers can prompt 
their suppliers to engage in CSR without overtly exerting pressure, especially if they demonstrate 
their CSR orientation to suppliers who possess relatively less power. Second, our study should 
raise managers’ awareness that they might tend to be influenced by their own customers’ per-
ceived CSR orientation in combination with power. Furthermore, managers at supplier firms 
need to ensure that their CSR engagement does not appear to be extrinsically motivated. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
Our core proposition is that the conventional perspective on CSR enforcement in supply chains 
needs to be extended. Even if customers do not explicitly pressure their suppliers (voluntarily or 
as a result of soft or hard public policy interventions), we propose that powerful customer firms’ 
CSR orientation may cause suppliers to perceive pressure. This perceived pressure should then 
result in an elevated intention to engage in CSR, which in turn should increase a supplier’s actual 
CSR engagement. To test these propositions, we conducted the two studies illustrated in Figure 
1. In what follows, we describe the conceptual framework of these studies. 
Study 1: Establishing the Extended Chain of CSR Enforcement 
In Study 1, we used dyadic field data of customer and supplier firms to examine the effects of the 
conventional and extended chains of CSR enforcement. Figure 2, which shows our full research 
model, depicts a framework linking customer CSR orientation to supplier CSR engagement (a) 
via the conventional chain of customer exerted CSR pressure and (b) via our proposed extended 
chain, i.e. the interactive effect of customer CSR orientation and customer power. 
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Along the conventional chain, we define customer CSR orientation as the degree to which a cus-
tomer firm places value on ethical behavior and commitment to CSR (Banerjee, Iyer, and 
Kashyap 2003). Customer exerted CSR pressure is the degree to which a customer firm overtly 
enforces suppliers’ CSR engagement through its purchasing processes. Supplier CSR engage-
ment refers to the extent of a supplier company’s CSR activities (Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 
2009). Supplier CSR reputation is a customer’s evaluation of the degree to which a supplier is 
socially responsible (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007). 
We propose that the extended chain linking a customer’s CSR orientation to a supplier’s CSR 
engagement is influenced by a number of variables. In particular, we suggest that the effect of 
customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR engagement is moderated by three dimensions of 
customer power: supplier competitive intensity, defined as the degree to which customers have 
alternative sources of supply and are therefore less dependent on a particular supplier (Cannon 
and Perreault 1999; Ingenbleek and Immink 2010); relative customer firm size, defined as the 
magnitude of a customer company in comparison to a supplier company; and supplier product 
commoditization, defined as the extent to which a supplier offers standardized rather than cus-
tomized products (Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann 2011). 
Furthermore, we propose that the effect of supplier CSR engagement on supplier CSR reputation 
is moderated by extrinsic CSR attribution, a customer’s perception that a supplier’s CSR engage-
ment is driven by self-interested motives (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007). 
----- Insert Figure 2 about here ----- 
Study 2: The Underlying Drivers the Extended Chain of CSR Enforcement 
In Study 2, we used a scenario experiment to further elucidate the interactive effect of customer 
CSR orientation and customer power on supplier CSR engagement (see Figure 2). We propose 
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that the interactive effect of customer CSR orientation and customer power increases the pres-
sure a supplier perceives to engage in CSR—even in the absence of exerted pressure from the 
customer. We define supplier perceived CSR pressure as a supplier’s cognition of being driven 
to engage in CSR by a customer. We link supplier perceived CSR pressure to supplier CSR in-
tention, defined as the extent to which a supplier plans to engage in CSR activities. As higher 
levels of intention lead to higher levels of engagement (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977), we confined 
our experiment to the study of the effects of customer CSR orientation and customer power on 
supplier perceived CSR pressure and supplier CSR intention. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
As noted above, our key prediction is that depending on the context, customer companies can in-
fluence their suppliers to increase their CSR activities through an extended chain of CSR en-
forcement, i.e. without exerting explicit pressure on their suppliers. We derive this prediction 
from various sources, such as the literature on the role of power in supply chains. 
The Role of a Customer’s CSR Orientation and Power as an Antecedent of a Supplier’s 
CSR Engagement 
Existent literature proposes that customers should (normatively) or do (empirically) care about 
their suppliers’ CSR engagement (e.g., Maignan and Ferrell 2004) and has thus elaborated the 
mechanism of the conventional chain of CSR enforcement. However, we propose that a powerful 
customer’s CSR orientation is sufficient to influence a supplier’s CSR engagement. 
This prediction is derived from literature on customer orientation that shows that suppliers care 
about what is important to their customers (e.g., Anderson and Onyemah 2006; Jaworski and 
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Kohli 1993), since such a behavior will make firms more successful in the market place (e.g., 
Hult and Ketchen 2001). Following the norm of customer orientation, we argue that the supplier 
of a company that considers CSR a high priority will be more inclined to increase its CSR en-
gagement to fulfill this specific customer need than to invest in other elements of the customer–
supplier relationship that the customer seemingly values less. 
However, we propose that this effect holds only if a customer has high power relative to the sup-
plier (e.g., Ingenbleek and Immink 2010). Power in general can be defined as one’s ability to in-
fluence someone else do something the latter would otherwise not do (Dahl 1957). Notably, 
power is a capacity derived from circumstantial factors, and is not limited to situations entailing 
the actual use of power. Power-dependence theory explains the mechanism by which subjects 
gain power (Blau 1964). According to this theory, “power resides implicitly in the other’s de-
pendency” (Emerson 1962, p. 32). Put differently, “A’s power over B is directly related to the 
degree to which B is dependent on A” (Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale 2005, p. 801). Owing to this 
dependence, higher levels of customer power make suppliers more inclined to follow customer 
needs and values to maintain the relationship (Christensen and Bower 1996). 
Prior studies have repeatedly analyzed the power distribution between customers and suppliers in 
B2B settings (e.g., Gaski 1984; Lusch and Brown 1982). From that research, we distilled three 
sources of power, which we included in our hypotheses and analysis: 
(i) Supplier competitive intensity (e.g., Porter 1980). Following power-dependence theory (Blau 
1964; Emerson 1962), customer–supplier exchanges in highly competitive supplier industries 
will typically move power from the supplier to the customer: High competition within the sup-
plier industry provides customers with the opportunity to choose among multiple possible suppli-
ers, rendering the supplier more dependent on the customer than vice versa. 
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(ii) Relative customer firm size (e.g., Porter 1980). A small supplier selling products to a large 
firm will—ceteris paribus—be more willing to follow customer expectations: (a) the supplier 
might be intimidated by the customer (Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000) and consider itself dependent 
on the customer; (b) the supplier might be particularly interested in winning and keeping the cus-
tomer as a reference customer to display its market capabilities and build reputation (Helm and 
Salinen 2010); and (c) large customers promise prospects of large future business volume. 
(iii) Supplier product commoditization. When suppliers sell commodity products instead of prod-
ucts customized to a customer’s specific needs, the customers will tend to be less dependent on 
the supplier’s specific resources and thus be likely to be more powerful in the supplier–customer 
exchange (Jiang, Zhan, and Rucker 2014). Therefore: 
H1a: The interactive effect of a customer’s CSR orientation and competitive intensity in 
the supplier’s industry on a supplier’s CSR engagement is positive. 
H1b: The interactive effect of a customer’s CSR orientation and the customer’s relative 
size on a supplier’s CSR engagement is positive. 
H1c: The interactive effect of a customer’s CSR orientation and a supplier’s product com-
moditization on a supplier’s CSR engagement is positive. 
The Role of a Supplier’s Perceived Pressure 
In the development of H1a-c, we demonstrated why a customer’s CSR orientation in interaction 
with relative power is likely to positively influence a supplier’s CSR engagement. To further elu-
cidate the connection between a customer’s CSR orientation and a supplier’s CSR engagement, 
we resorted to the literature on stakeholder pressure. This stream of research has shown that indi-
viduals within firms can perceive high levels of pressure from stakeholders to engage in activi-
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ties that a company otherwise might not have undertaken. That is, the level of perceived stake-
holder pressure does not necessarily reflect “objective” pressure (Delmas and Toffel 2004). 
Building on this notion, we propose that differences in reactions to a given level of exerted pres-
sure could be explained on the basis of differences in perceived pressure. Assuming a constant 
level of exerted pressure, we suggest that a customer’s CSR orientation in interaction with the 
customer’s power results in a supplier’s perception of pressure to engage in CSR in order to ful-
fill the customer’s needs. Therefore, we postulate: 
H2: The effect of a customer’s CSR orientation on a supplier’s perceived CSR pressure is 
more pronounced for high customer power. 
The literature on stakeholder pressure has established that perceived pressure will lead to higher 
levels of engagement in different domains, such as adherence to ISO standards (Christmann and 
Taylor 2006). In line with this research we therefore also posit: 
H3: A supplier’s perceived pressure to engage in CSR increases the supplier’s intention 
to engage in CSR. 
Outcomes of a Supplier’s CSR Engagement 
Prior research has established that a supplier’s actual CSR engagement will heighten its CSR 
reputation with the customer (e.g., Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007; Homburg, Stierl, and Borne-
mann 2013). However, we propose that the effect of a supplier’s CSR engagement on its CSR 
reputation with the customer will be negatively moderated by extrinsic attribution. According to 
attribution theory (Heider 1958; Silvera and Laufer 2005), individuals seek to explain other par-
ties’ behavior by making attributions with respect to underlying motives, intentions, and senti-
ments. Attributions may be either intrinsic or extrinsic: intrinsic attributions are inferences that 
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the other party behaves in a certain way because of inherent character or personality, while ex-
trinsic attributions suggest that motives arise from external situational circumstances. In the con-
text of CSR, the underlying precept is that customers’ appraisal of their suppliers’ CSR engage-
ment depends on attributions they make about the motivation for these activities (Walker et al. 
2010). We therefore examine customers’ extrinsic CSR attributions and their effects on the CSR 
reputation suppliers can develop from engaging in CSR. 
We expect a customer to react negatively if the customer perceives the supplier’s CSR engage-
ment to be merely a means of fostering the firm’s own interest or a result of external pressure. 
Such extrinsic attributions are likely to lead to the conclusion that the firm is not inherently so-
cially responsible (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007) and that the supplier is only “acting to avoid 
retribution from stakeholders” (Vlachos et al. 2009, p. 172). Such CSR engagement is perceived 
as reactive, unstable, forced, and insincere (Groza, Pronschinske, and Walker 2011). In line with 
correspondent inference theory (Jones and Davis 1965; Jones and Harris 1967), we expect such 
attributions to lead to negative inferences about the actor. Hence, we anticipate that extrinsic at-
tributions will result in negative perceptions regarding a supplier firm’s underlying motives for 
engaging in CSR. This perception may eventually spill over to a customer’s evaluation of a sup-
plier’s CSR reputation. 
H4: The effect of a supplier’s CSR engagement on its CSR reputation is less pronounced 
if the customer perceives extrinsic motives for the CSR engagement. 
 
Study 1: Establishing the Extended Chain of CSR Enforcement 
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Data Collection and Sample 
As our study’s unit of analysis is the supplier–customer relationship, we collected dyadic sup-
plier–customer data from a broad range of B2B industries. We acquired contact information for 
purchasing managers of 2,100 companies from a market research institute. We then sent surveys 
to these purchasing managers and asked them to complete the survey with regard to a specific 
relationship with one of their suppliers. We received 372 usable responses (response rate of 
17.7%). Subsequently, we contacted the corresponding supplier key informants and asked them 
to fill out a survey and received 200 usable supplier responses (response rate of 53.8%). Web 
Appendix W2 shows the sample’s composition. 
Measures 
Main variables. Whenever available we based all measures on established scales. We used a re-
flective measurement approach and seven-point rating scales for all multi-item constructs (Jarvis, 
MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2003). We obtained customer CSR orientation and customer exerted 
CSR pressure from the respective customer key informant. Customer CSR orientation is meas-
ured using the items “Our firm has a clear policy statement urging CSR awareness in every area 
of operations,” “CSR is a high priority activity in our firm,” and “At our firm, we make a con-
certed effort to make every employee understand the importance of CSR” (Banerjee, Iyer, and 
Kashyap 2003). Our measure for customer exerted CSR pressure comprises the items “In our 
purchase decision, social and ecological aspects are an important factor,” “We draw our suppli-
ers’ attention to our CSR expectations in our purchase policies,” and “In our contracts with com-
panies like the focal supplier we specify the compliance with specific sustainability criteria.” 
We measured supplier CSR engagement in the supplier survey using the items “Our company … 
is a socially responsible company,” “… is concerned to improve the well-being of society,” and 
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“… follows high ethical standards” (Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009). Lastly, we measured sup-
plier CSR reputation in the customer survey using the items “The supplier … is a socially re-
sponsible company,” “… is concerned to improve the well-being of society,” and “… follows 
high ethical standards” (Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009). 
Moderators. We measured supplier competitive intensity in the supplier survey using four items 
(Jaworski and Kohli 1993): “Competition in this business is severe,” “One hears of new competi-
tive moves almost every day,” “Intensive marketing activities are a hallmark of our industry,” 
and “Anything that one competitor can offer, others can match readily.” To operationalize rela-
tive customer firm size, we asked both supplier and customer key informants to state the number 
of employees (“below 50,” “50 to <100,” “100 to <500,” “500 to <1,000,” “1,000 to <2,500,” 
“2,500 to <5,000,” “5,000 to <10,000,” “more than 10,000”). We then calculated the relative size 
by subtracting the customers’ ratings from the suppliers’ ratings. That is, if customer firms are 
larger (smaller) than supplier firms, the measure is positive (negative). Moreover, we measured 
supplier product commoditization using three items in the supplier survey (“Our products and 
services are individually developed for our customers,” “Our products and services are highly 
adapted to our customers’ needs,” “The major characteristics of our products and services are 
highly adjusted to our customers”; reverse-coded items) (Homburg, Müller, and Klarmann 
2011). Lastly, we measured the moderator extrinsic CSR attribution in the customer survey using 
the items “I think company X engages in CSR because it feels … competitive pressures to en-
gage in such activities,” “… customer pressures to engage in such activities,” “… societal pres-
sures to engage in such activities” (Du, Bhattacharya, and Sen 2007). Before the estimation, we 
mean-centered all moderators (Aiken and West 1991). 
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Controls. To partial out effects that stem from the customer–supplier relationship rather than 
from the interaction of CSR orientation and power distribution, we controlled for the length of 
relationship. We measured length of the relationship by asking customers how many years they 
had been a customer of the supplier. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics, correlations, and reliability diagnostics for all constructs. 
Overall, our scales exhibit desirable psychometric properties (Bagozzi and Yi 2012). In addition, 
all constructs exhibit discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). This finding is particu-
larly important with respect to our three dimensions of customer power. As each of these con-
structs determines to what extent a customer firm has power over a supplier firm, these con-
structs may theoretically overlap, which might pose problems to multivariate analyses. However, 
in our dataset these constructs do not turn out to be highly correlated (rsupplier competitive intensity, relative 
customer firm size = -.04, p > .05; rsupplier competitive intensity, supplier product commoditization = .01, p > .05; rrelative 
customer firm size, supplier product commoditization = -.13, p > .05). Furthermore, the Fornell–Larcker criterion 
(Fornell and Larcker 1981), which can be applied to the two multi-item constructs supplier com-
petitive intensity and supplier product commoditization, provides strong evidence that these con-
structs are discriminant. Thus, including them in multivariate analyses did not unduly influence 
our results. 
----- Insert Table 1 about here ----- 
Model Specification and Results 
We specified a path model in line with our conceptual framework for Study 1 (see Figure 2). We 
then estimated the model using Mplus 7.0 (Muthén and Muthén 2012). Hereby, we estimated all 
relationships simultaneously using structural equation modeling. Thus, we estimated the effect of 
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the extended chain while controlling for the conventional chain of CSR enforcement. The “Full 
Model” in Table 2 shows the results, which we interpret in the following. 
----- Insert Table 2 about here ----- 
First, we note that our results support the established, conventional chain of CSR enforcement. 
That is, customer CSR orientation strongly affects customer exerted CSR pressure (β = .78, p < 
.01), which in turn increases supplier CSR engagement (β = .17, p < .05). Furthermore, the prod-
uct of the two coefficients is significantly positive (β = .14, p < .05), suggesting that customer 
CSR orientation has an indirect effect on supplier CSR engagement via customer exerted CSR 
pressure (Baron and Kenny 1986). 
Turning to our hypotheses, in H1a through H1c, we posit that dimensions of customer power af-
fect the strength of the effect of customers’ CSR orientation on suppliers’ CSR engagement. H1a 
posits that competitive intensity in the supplier’s industry and a customer’s CSR orientation in-
teractively affect the supplier’s CSR engagement. The interaction effect of supplier competitive 
intensity and customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR engagement is positive and significant 
(β = .16, p < .05). Hence, H1a is supported. Similarly, in H1b, we propose that a customer’s rela-
tive size and a customers’ CSR orientation interactively affect suppliers’ CSR engagement. The 
interaction effect of relative customer firm size and customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR 
engagement is significantly positive (β = .18, p < .01). Hence, H1b is confirmed. Lastly, H1c ar-
gues that suppliers’ product commoditization and customers’ CSR orientation interactively affect 
suppliers’ CSR engagement. The corresponding coefficient is positive and significant (β = .12, p 
< .05). Hence, H1c receives support. In effect, all three hypothesized interaction effects of cus-
tomer power and customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR engagement are supported. 
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Considering the effect of supplier CSR engagement on supplier CSR reputation, we proposed in 
H4 that extrinsic CSR attribution negatively moderates the effect of a supplier’s CSR engage-
ment on the supplier’s CSR reputation. Results support this proposition (β = -.13, p < .05). Ac-
cordingly, H4 is supported. 
Supplemental Analysis 
To verify the robustness of our results, we conducted several supplemental analyses. First, to 
check the explanatory power of our model, we repeated the model estimation without the ex-
tended chain of CSR enforcement (see “Conventional Chain Model” in Table 2). That is, we esti-
mated the indirect effect of customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR engagement via customer 
exerted CSR pressure without accounting for the conditional direct effect of customer CSR ori-
entation on supplier CSR engagement. Results reveal that the model has a lower fit than the full 
model. This suggests that the extended chain of CSR enforcement is a valuable addition to previ-
ously established models in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of a cus-
tomer’s CSR enforcement vis-à-vis its suppliers. 
Second, to understand the relative importance of the conventional and extended chain of CSR 
enforcement, we compared the respective effect strengths. As mentioned previously, the conven-
tional chain is represented by the indirect effect of customer CSR orientation on supplier CSR 
engagement via customer exerted CSR pressure (β = .14, p < .05). Conversely, the extended 
chain is represented by the conditional (i.e., moderated) direct effect of customer CSR orienta-
tion on supplier CSR engagement. We derived the strength of this direct effect by re-estimating 
our model at different values of our moderators (Spiller et al. 2013). Results are depicted in Ta-
ble 3 and reveal that the relative effect size of the conventional and extended chain of CSR en-
forcement strongly depends on the value of our moderators. Specifically, if all moderators have 
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medium values or only one of the moderators has a high value, the conventional chain is stronger 
than the extended chain. However, as soon as two customer power moderators have high values 
and the remaining moderator has a medium value, the strength of the extended chain surmounts 
the strength of the conventional chain. This finding underlines the importance of unveiling the 
extended chain to understand how customers enforce CSR in B2B supply chains. 
----- Insert Table 3 about here ----- 
Third, to verify the robustness of our results, we estimated an additional model in which we also 
included the three power dimensions as moderators of the conventional chain of CSR enforce-
ment. However, our previous results remained stable, albeit with a lower fit of the path model. 
Thus, we refrained from including these interactive effects in our main analyses. 
Fourth and last, one alternative explanation of our findings pertaining to the extended chain of 
CSR enforcement may be that customer firms preemptively select supplier firms based on their 
CSR engagement. More specifically, it may be that it is not the supplier firm that opts to take on 
CSR engagement to match the interests of the customer firm, but that the customer firm may 
have several options of supplier firms and selects the one that best matches its CSR engagement. 
To test this alternative explanation, we estimated an additional model (Model 3 in Table 2) in 
which we controlled for additional variables: (a) We controlled for a variable that measures the 
extent to which a customer’s supplier selection considers reputation risks. This variable, labeled 
customer risk mitigating supplier selection, is measured through the item “By selecting this sup-
plier we reduce the danger of negative reports about our company.” Controlling for this variable 
may isolate the extended chain of CSR enforcement from a mere selection effect. (b) We con-
trolled for customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing, measured through the item 
“Sustainability criteria are gaining more and more importance in our purchase decisions,” as well 
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as the interaction of this variable with the length of the relationship between the customer firm 
and the supplier firm. The rationale behind this step is that a customer firm that exhibits increas-
ing importance of CSR in purchasing and has a long relationship with a supplier should have 
been less likely to start the relationship with this supplier based on sustainability criteria, as this 
aspect was initially of lower relevance. Results of Model 3 show that our hypothesized effects 
are robust against inclusion of these additional controls. While this reduces the likelihood of a 
selection effect, we acknowledge that it does not fully rule out such an effect. 
Discussion of Study 1 
Study 1 confirms our proposition of a so far undescribed, extended chain of CSR enforcement in 
B2B supply chains. If a customer is oriented toward CSR and has high power vis-à-vis the sup-
plier, the supplier is more likely to engage in CSR. Our rationale for this effect is that the combi-
nation of a customer’s CSR orientation and power causes a supplier to perceive pressure to en-
gage in CSR, independent of whether a customer exerts pressure to engage in CSR. Explaining 
the reason for this effect was beyond the scope of Study 1. Specifically, in H2 and H3 we pro-
posed that a supplier’s perceived CSR pressure mediates the effect of a customer’s CSR orienta-
tion and power on CSR engagement. To test this proposition, we conducted a second study. 
 
Study 2: The Drivers Underlying the Extended Chain of CSR Enforcement 
 
Experimental Design 
Study 2 comprises a scenario experiment with a 2 (customer CSR orientation: low vs. high)  2 
(customer power: low vs. high) design. The scenario informed participants that they were the 
CEO of a company that produced valves for industrial customers. Participants then read about 
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one of their customers, who depending on the treatment condition scored either low or high on 
customer CSR orientation and customer power. To manipulate customer CSR orientation, partic-
ipants read about the customer’s ranking in a newspaper report on CSR. To manipulate customer 
power, we deployed the dimensions of power established in Study 1. That is, in the low (high) 
customer power condition, we informed participants that their company was operating in an in-
dustry with low (high) competitive intensity, was larger (smaller) than the customer, and offered 
a customized (commodity) product. We thus intended to manipulate customer power comprehen-
sively rather than individual dimensions of power. Web Appendix W3 presents the full treat-
ments. After reading the scenario, participants evaluated supplier perceived CSR pressure, sup-
plier CSR intention, and further variables. To avoid demand effects, we assured participants that 
the survey was anonymous and had no right or wrong answers (Podsakoff et al. 2003). 
Sample 
To facilitate external validity, we collected a diverse sample of experienced professionals for the 
experiment. These included participants of several executive education programs and a smaller 
number of MBA students of business schools in Germany and Portugal and were randomly as-
signed to one of the four groups. This procedure resulted in a sample of 173 participants, ranging 
between 42 and 45 across experimental conditions. Web Appendix W4 shows the sample com-
position. To ensure that groups were comparable, we inspected the distributions of age and gen-
der and found no significant differences across groups. Participants were on average 35 years old 
and 66% were male. Participants were from 29 different countries, 69% worked in B2B indus-
tries, and 67% were in a management position at the time of the survey. These managers had an 
average of 7 years of leadership experience and an average of 10 subordinates. Further, 76% of 
these managers were managers of managers with an average of 67 indirect subordinates. 
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Measures 
Supplier perceived CSR pressure. We measured supplier perceived CSR pressure in two ways. 
First, following the approach of Unsworth et al. (2012), we asked participants two questions re-
ferring to the degree to which they believed the customer supported CSR enforcement (“To what 
extent do you believe the customer thinks you should increase your engagement in CSR?”) and 
the degree to which they valued the opinion of the customer (“To what extent do you value the 
opinion of the customer in relation to increasing your engagement in CSR?”). We then multi-
plied these sets of items to obtain a measure of perceived pressure (Unsworth et al. 2012), here-
after labeled “measure 1.” Second, we measured supplier perceived CSR pressure through three 
self-developed items on seven-point Likert scales (“As Meier GmbH, in this situation, I would 
… perceive pressure to engage in CSR myself,” “… feel forced to engage in CSR myself,” “… 
feel rushed to engage in CSR myself.”), hereafter labeled “measure 2.” In our analyses, we report 
the results using both measures of supplier perceived CSR pressure. 
Supplier CSR intention. To measure supplier CSR intention, we used the items “In this situation I 
would work towards … making my company a socially responsible company,” “… making my 
company improve the well-being of society,” and “… making my company follow high ethical 
standards” (Wagner, Lutz, and Weitz 2009). The scale achieved desirable reliability (α = .81). 
Controls. As participants may be influenced by their personal opinions regarding CSR as well as 
their real-life experiences, we collected two control variables. First, we measured participants’ 
personal attitude toward CSR using eight items (sample item: “Companies should act in a re-
sponsible way regarding the environment”) (Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 2004; Mohr 
and Webb 2005). Second, we collected employer CSR orientation, which pertains to participants’ 
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actual employers. For this, we used three items (sample item: “Our firm has a clear policy state-
ment urging CSR awareness in every area of operations”) (Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003). 
Results 
Validity checks. Before the hypotheses testing, we conducted three checks to establish the valid-
ity of the experimental design. First, we conducted manipulation checks to verify that the treat-
ments had the expected effects. Therefore, at the end of the survey (that is, after measuring all 
other variables used in this study) we asked participants to evaluate the customer’s CSR orienta-
tion using the items “The customer has a clear policy statement urging CSR awareness in every 
area of operations,” “CSR is a high priority activity in the customer firm,” and “The customer 
makes a concerted effort to make every employee understand the importance of CSR” (Banerjee, 
Iyer, and Kashyap 2003). Results showed that the manipulation of CSR orientation had the in-
tended effect (Mlow CSR orientation = 1.97, Mhigh CSR orientation = 5.03, p < .001). We also asked partici-
pants to evaluate the customer’s power using three seven-point semantic differentials at the end 
of the survey (“The customer has [low/high] power to influence my company,” “The customer is 
[less/more] powerful than my company,” and “My company [does not depend/strongly depends] 
on the customer”). Participants perceived the customer to be significantly less powerful in the 
low-power than in the high-power condition (Mlow power = 3.22, Mhigh power = 5.12, p < .001). 
Second, we asked participants to evaluate on a seven-point scale whether the scenario could hap-
pen in the real world. Results showed that participants considered the experiment to be suffi-
ciently realistic (M = 5.28). 
Third, to preclude demand effects (Podsakoff et al. 2003), we asked participants to guess the 
study’s hypotheses. Two independent coders who were not involved in the study then coded 
whether participants accurately guessed our key hypothesis that the effect of a customer’s CSR 
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orientation on a supplier’s perceived CSR pressure is more pronounced for high customer power. 
The coders agreed that no participant identified this hypothesis correctly, providing evidence that 
demand effects are not a serious concern in this study. 
Hypotheses testing. We specified a path model in line with our conceptual framework in Figure 
2. We entered treatment dummies as independent variables (Bagozzi 1977) and also included the 
control variables outlined above. We estimated the model using Mplus 7.0 (Muthén and Muthén 
2012). Table 4 shows the results (Model 1a for measure 1 of supplier perceived CSR pressure 
and Model 2a for measure 2 of supplier perceived CSR pressure). 
In H2 we propose that the interaction of customer CSR orientation and customer power has a 
positive effect on supplier perceived CSR pressure. In line with this hypothesis, the interactive 
effect of customer CSR orientation and customer power on supplier perceived CSR pressure is 
significantly positive (Model 1a: β = .32, p < .01; Model 2a: β = .22, p < .05). Thus, H2 is sup-
ported. Furthermore, in H3 we posit that supplier perceived CSR pressure increases supplier CSR 
intention. The corresponding coefficient is positive and significant (Model 1a: β = .24, p < .01; 
Model 2a: β = .31, p < .01), supporting H3. 
To gain further insight into the nature of the interactive effect of customer CSR orientation and 
customer power on supplier perceived CSR pressure, Figure 3 depicts the mean values of sup-
plier perceived CSR pressure across the treatment conditions. As can be seen, in line with our 
reasoning in H2, participants perceived highest pressure to engage in CSR in the condition with 
high customer CSR orientation and high customer power. 
Supplemental Analysis 
To verify the robustness of our results, we repeated our model estimation using a more rigorous 
sample. While as mentioned previously no participant correctly guessed our key hypothesis, the 
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independent observers noted that 21 participants at least guessed that our study had to do some-
thing with pressure to engage in CSR. Excluding these 21 participants from the sample (Model 
1b and Model 2b) yielded results which are largely in line with the results in our full sample. 
This provides evidence that our results are not unduly influenced by a social desirability bias. 
----- Insert Table 4 about here ----- 
----- Insert Figure 3 about here ----- 
Discussion of Study 2 
Results of Study 2 explain why a customer’s CSR orientation in combination with customer 
power increases suppliers’ CSR engagement. That is, if a customer is strongly oriented toward 
CSR and simultaneously exhibits high power, suppliers perceive greater pressure to engage in 
CSR activities. This pressure leads to an increased intention to engage in CSR activities. As a re-
sult, a reasonable assumption is that suppliers are more likely to engage in CSR—which is also 
what we found in Study 1. 
An interesting question is how exactly suppliers’ perceived pressure to engage in CSR activities 
emerges. As argued previously, we propose that the norm of customer orientation leads supplier 
firms with low levels of power vis-à-vis their CSR-oriented customers to perceive a pressure to 
also engage in CSR. It may well be that suppliers’ perceived CSR pressure rests on further psy-
chological mechanisms such as (a) an anticipation of or desire to preempt exerted pressure from 
their customers (or even from other stakeholders such as policy makers, NGOs, or the media) or 
(b) a fear to potentially lose customers if not following their example. We expect that suppliers’ 
perceived CSR pressure is the result of a complex interaction of multiple effects that deserve at-
tention in future research. For the establishment of the extended chain however, our study 
demonstrated that at a given level of exerted pressure, suppliers will perceive different levels of 
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pressure to engage in CSR—and that the conventional and extended chain in combination have a 
higher explanatory value than any of the two in isolation. 
 
Discussion 
 
Research Insights 
Summary of results. Our research complements the existing evidence that customers can in fact 
induce their suppliers to increase their CSR engagement. First, our study confirms the estab-
lished conventional chain of CSR enforcement according to which (voluntary or regulation-in-
duced) exerted CSR pressure by a customer firm, such as inclusion of CSR requirements in cus-
tomers’ buying policies and contractual agreements with suppliers, will lead to higher levels of 
CSR engagement by the suppliers. Second, our research establishes an additional path to increas-
ing suppliers’ CSR engagement even in the absence of exerted pressure—the extended chain of 
CSR enforcement in B2B supply chains: the interaction of customer’s CSR orientation with cus-
tomer’s power emerged as an important additional driver of supplier’s CSR engagement. 
Furthermore, we found this alternative route to a supplier’s CSR engagement to be mediated by 
suppliers’ perceived pressure to engage in CSR. At a given level of exerted pressure, suppliers 
perceive higher levels of pressure if their customers care about CSR and possess power. This 
higher level of perceived pressure fosters suppliers’ intention to engage in CSR and eventually 
increases their CSR engagement. 
Whether suppliers benefit from a higher CSR reputation with their customers strongly depends 
on customers’ attributions as to why a supplier engages in CSR, as lower levels of extrinsic at-
tributions strengthen the effect of a supplier’s CSR engagement on CSR reputation. Conversely, 
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for higher levels of extrinsic attribution, the effect of a supplier’s CSR engagement on CSR repu-
tation may become negative. 
Theoretical contributions. Our study makes at least three contributions to academic literature. 
First, our findings extend prior research on the antecedents of suppliers’ CSR engagement in 
B2B supply chains. Although prior research has established that customers can explicitly pres-
sure their suppliers to engage in CSR (e.g., Banerjee, Iyer, and Kashyap 2003), an effect we label 
the conventional chain of CSR enforcement, our study shows that explicit customer pressure is 
only one of at least two routes to increase CSR in supply chains. The second route—the extended 
chain of CSR enforcement—comes into play if customers are oriented toward CSR and powerful 
vis-à-vis their suppliers. Under these circumstances, suppliers perceive pressure to engage in 
CSR, which ultimately leads to an increase in CSR engagement. 
Second, these findings contribute to wider research on stakeholder pressure. Prior research has 
largely viewed stakeholder pressure as stakeholders’ explicit demands of companies. For exam-
ple, “outside stakeholder groups can engage in a set of actions such as protests, civil suits, and 
letter-writing campaigns to advance their interests, [providing] strong incentives for ﬁrms to 
meet stakeholder demands …” (Eesley and Lennox 2006, p. 765). Our results suggest that this 
view may be too narrow, as we show that even in the absence of explicit pressure, organizations 
perceive pressure to conform to stakeholders’ values if these stakeholders are powerful. We sug-
gest that literature on stakeholder pressure should incorporate this rather subtle way of stake-
holder pressure and examine its applicability and boundaries outside the domain of CSR or cus-
tomer–supplier interactions. 
Third, our results contribute to literature on power in supply chains, which academic literature 
has frequently recognized to be vital to enforce interests (e.g., Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; 
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Lusch and Brown 1982). Our results support the notion that at least three contingency factors de-
termine the power distribution between customers and suppliers: (i) the higher (lower) the com-
petitive intensity in a supplier market, the higher (lower) the power of a given customer vis-à-vis 
a supplier; (ii) the larger (smaller) a customer compared to a supplier, the higher (lower) the 
power of the customer vis-à-vis the supplier; and (iii) the more (less) a product or service of a 
supplier is a commodity, the higher (lower) the power of the customer vis-à-vis the supplier. Fu-
ture research may examine whether these determinants of power also influence the enforcement 
of interests outside the CSR domain, such as the enforcement of prices or quality standards. 
Public Policy Implications 
Enforcement of CSR in supply chains has gained significant traction in the past years—not only 
in practice and research, but also in public policy making (e.g., EU Commission 2014). How-
ever, given the continuous increase in the complexities of supplier–customer interactions in B2B 
supply networks (in which firms can simultaneously take on different roles vis-à-vis each other 
and that frequently reach across several national/regulatory boundaries) direct and hard regula-
tion of CSR engagement of all actors along their entire value chains might prove to be practically 
infeasible without unnecessarily inflating transaction costs beyond reasonable levels. Transaction 
costs will be increased whenever policy makers simultaneously impose multiple kinds of CSR-
related regulation (e.g., about social and environmental standards, non-financial reporting, and 
product labeling) from different angles (e.g., governments, supra-national entities, and financial 
authorities) to all players within their regulatory regimes. Accordingly, many participants in a 
multi-stakeholder dialog initiated by the EU Commission argued that one of the main challenges 
of public policy making was “to strike the right balance between regulatory and voluntary 
measures” especially regarding Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) (EU Commission 2014, 
 28 
p. 3). The extended chain of CSR enforcement as a complement to the established, conventional 
chain allows policy makers to take a much more targeted and pragmatic approach of CSR en-
forcement as powerful firms’ CSR orientation can trigger a strong domino effect upward in the 
supply chain along the following considerations. 
First, our findings suggest that policy makers can legitimately focus their attention towards the 
end of the supply chain, i.e. on B2C companies. CSR enforcement is then likely to cascade up-
stream the supply chain from B2C companies to their B2B suppliers. This is true for the conven-
tional chain, but even more so for the extended chain as the latter works even in absence of com-
pany or policy induced enforcement (i) at significantly lower cost, (ii) without regional limita-
tions, and (iii) with lower risks of counter-reactions (Baden, Harwood, and Woodward 2009). 
Policies that aim at triggering voluntary CSR engagement along the extended chain starting at 
B2C firms would not be in line with most current types of CSR regulation. Most existing policies 
do not differentiate between B2B and B2C, but rather target certain business practices or indus-
try sectors that are considered to be particularly problematic. A focus on leveraging the extended 
chain by starting with B2C firms, however, could trigger the desired chain effect of increasing 
CSR engagement from one supply tier to the next supply tier starting at the most logical point 
without the exertion of pressure. That being said, such a chain effect might take longer as CSR 
orientation and engagement will need to “travel” upstream in the supply chain. 
Second, our research shows that a customer company’s CSR orientation (in interaction with cus-
tomer power) is an important antecedent for enforcing CSR within the supply chain along the ex-
tended chain. To perceive pressure to engage in CSR, supplier firms need to be aware about the 
importance of CSR for their customers. Accordingly, our research supports the current emphasis 
on CSR reporting within managerial and regulatory practice: mandatory, voluntary, or “comply 
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or explain” requirements for CSR reporting have gained significant relevance in the recent past 
(e.g., KPMG et al. 2016). Together with other forms of CSR communication, CSR reporting can 
serve as a strong signal of a company’s CSR orientation to its suppliers and lead these suppliers 
to perceive pressure to engage in CSR. Policy makers might use our empirical insight to confirm 
this part of their practice and complement their current activities by such proposals that will 
make CSR reporting not just generally public but especially accessible/targeted to supplier firms. 
Third, the extended chain of CSR enforcement points to the importance of power and most nota-
bly to the factor of firm size. Policy makers can leverage this insight by focusing soft (and possi-
bly also hard) regulation on large firms. Previous literature sometimes maintained that especially 
SMEs would not be accessible to voluntary CSR engagement. For example, Williamson and col-
leagues argued that “the use and development of existing regulatory structures, providing mini-
mum standards for many activities covered by CSR, remains the most effective means through 
which the behaviour of manufacturing SMEs will be changed in the short to medium-term” (Wil-
liamson, Lynch-Wood, and Ramsay 2006, p. 317). The existence of the extended chain of CSR 
enforcement, however, points to a different public policy implication: Given the role of large 
firms as important buyers of B2B products and services, policy making can aim at increasing 
these large firms’ CSR orientation, which will over time lead to an increased CSR engagement of 
their suppliers—again both as a result of the conventional and the extended chain—especially if 
these supplier firms are relatively small. 
Fourth, sector specific CSR regulation so far frequently focused on aspects such as harm or dam-
age caused (e.g., to employees, communities, or environment). Our research suggests that regula-
tors could advance sector specific regulation along two other dimensions: (a) CSR orientation: 
Our results show that CSR orientation is an essential prerequisite for the conventional and the 
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extended chain of CSR enforcement. Accordingly, public policy makers may support additional 
research about industry specific CSR orientation and focus regulatory pressures on such indus-
tries with low levels of CSR orientation. (b) Power: Our research also shows that CSR orienta-
tion in absence of customer power will not lead to CSR enforcement along the extended chain. 
Accordingly, policy makers may identify industries in which customer firms are notoriously 
weak and target direct regulation on these industries. 
Fifth, our analysis supports existing approaches to ensure CSR in business by leveraging the role 
of governments and supra-national bodies as economic actors (e.g., Fombrun 2005). Govern-
ments and supra-national bodies do not only regulate business but are simultaneously economic 
actors with own interests. For example, state-controlled or government-subsidized companies are 
usually very important (i.e. typically powerful) buyers of products and services. Given their sig-
nificance, they can effectively increase their suppliers’ CSR engagement through the conven-
tional and extended chains of CSR enforcement. Along this line, governments can not only en-
force CSR engagement of their direct suppliers, but trigger a trickle-down effect of CSR engage-
ment for the larger supply system. Leveraging the extended chain, they can aim at increasing 
their supply networks’ CSR engagement even without the need of direct regulation and in ab-
sence of explicit pressure, by just making their own CSR orientation public. 
Sixth and finally, our paper points to a need to reassess the way in which benefits from different 
policies are being estimated. Our results point to the fact (a) that CSR enforcement can not only 
be achieved through exerting explicit pressure, but also along the extended chain; (b) that both of 
these chains taken together will result in higher levels of supplier CSR engagement than each of 
them individually; and (c) that CSR engagement can trickle down the supply chain. Policy mak-
ers therefore ought to be more careful in evaluating the benefits of their policies as a mere focus 
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on the conventional chain of CSR enforcement might lead them to miss the benefits that—some-
what automatically and seemingly without effort—result through the extended chain and deeper 
in the supply chain. This aspect points to the danger of systematically underestimating the bene-
fits from policies that address CSR along the supply chain when only looking at the conventional 
chain or only looking at first level suppliers. Therefore, it is to be expected that currently fewer 
policies get implemented than would be implemented when taking the benefits derived along the 
extended chain into consideration. 
Managerial Implications 
Our research has several implications for managerial practice relating to both customer compa-
nies and supplier companies. Both might want to pro-actively and voluntarily engage in CSR, (a) 
to avoid explicit exertion of pressure by customers, (b) to preempt potential regulations by public 
policy makers, or to (c) avoid negative effects of extrinsic attributions of their CSR engagement. 
More specifically our study shows, first, that managers of customer firms do not need to explic-
itly pressure their suppliers to engage in CSR. Even without explicit exertion of pressure, power-
ful companies can increase the CSR engagement upstream in the supply chain if they truly value 
CSR and their suppliers are cognizant of this. Therefore, companies that intend to increase CSR 
engagement in their larger ecosystem might want to communicate the importance they place on 
CSR vis-à-vis their suppliers and the public. This can be done via different actions, such as CSR 
reporting, public statements from the top management, or by participating in CSR rankings. 
Second, in exploring the extended chain of CSR enforcement, customer companies can focus on 
less powerful suppliers, as our research shows that an elevated power position is a prerequisite 
for customers’ enforcement of suppliers’ CSR without explicit pressure. This criterion also helps 
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managers prioritize their efforts, as the complexity of many B2B settings may preclude increas-
ing the CSR engagement of all business partners simultaneously. 
Our research also holds important implications for suppliers. First, suppliers should be aware that 
they might be influenced by their perception of what powerful customers value. More specifi-
cally, if customers are CSR-oriented and possess high power, suppliers are tempted to blindly en-
gage in CSR themselves. To avoid preemptive obedience resulting in substantial costs, we sug-
gest that suppliers carefully evaluate whether their customers would truly value suppliers’ CSR 
engagement. Even if powerful customers make themselves out to be strongly oriented toward 
CSR, they may not necessarily expect their suppliers to engage in CSR as well. 
Second, suppliers should make sure that their customers attribute their CSR engagement to in-
trinsic motives. This is vital to improving suppliers’ CSR reputation and ultimately to gaining 
customers’ trust. Therefore, suppliers should carefully devise the communication of their CSR 
engagement and present it as not (merely) motivated by pressure perceived by their customers or 
other stakeholders. 
Implementing these suggestions may enable managers to extract at least three advantages from 
the extended chain of CSR enforcement. By refraining from overtly pressuring suppliers, (a) cus-
tomers and suppliers may save transaction costs (e.g., adaptation of purchasing policies, monitor-
ing of suppliers’ CSR engagements); (b) customers may avoid creating relationship strains and 
managers may be more likely to receive future relationship benefits; and (c) customers may be 
less likely to attribute suppliers’ CSR engagement to extrinsic motives, allowing suppliers to 
generate a higher CSR reputation and enjoy greater levels of customer trust. Thus, both custom-
ers and suppliers may be more satisfied with their mutual relationship. 
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Limitations and Avenues for Further Research 
Our study has several limitations that provide avenues for further research. First, our paper aimed 
at establishing the existence of the extended chain of CSR enforcement and identified supplier 
perceived CSR pressure as well as customer power as key elements of this extended chain. As 
mentioned previously, our research did not examine the specific psychological mechanisms link-
ing powerful customers’ CSR orientation and suppliers’ perceived pressure to engage in CSR. 
We encourage future research to conduct further analyses on these mechanisms. For example, as 
outlined before, future research may examine to what extent suppliers anticipate their powerful 
and CSR-oriented customers to exert pressure to engage in CSR. 
Second, as we conducted our study solely in B2B industries, we cannot draw conclusions for 
B2C industries. As in B2B markets typically multiple individuals interact on both the customer 
and the supplier side, the responsibility for and the enforcement of CSR are distributed and dif-
fused. The interaction of the various effects within the extended chain of CSR enforcement 
might therefore be different in B2C and possibly also in B2G (business-to-government) settings. 
Third, we focused on the conceptualization and empirical testing of an extended chain of CSR 
enforcement in B2B supply chains for a rather general understanding of CSR. Future studies 
might differentiate the impact of the extended chain of CSR enforcements on various aspects of 
CSR, as the interaction effect of customer CSR orientation and customer power on a supplier’s 
CSR engagement may differ for individual aspects such as philanthropic and business process-
related CSR, or for different aspects such as environmental or social CSR activities. 
Fourth, neither the conventional nor the extended chain of CSR enforcement claim to holistically 
explain all drivers or the entire process of a supplier’s implementation of CSR engagement. Ra-
ther, they present partial models focusing on specific effects that prevail, ceteris paribus. Future 
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studies might integrate our results in more comprehensive models of CSR engagement drivers, 
for example accounting for the influence of further stakeholder groups (including public policy 
makers) or the general context on suppliers’ CSR engagement. Additionally, future research 
might examine the process of a supplier’s implementation of CSR engagement as triggered by 
the conventional and extended chain of CSR enforcement, such as suppliers’ internal decision 
processes or customer–supplier negotiations. 
Fifth, our study is purely descriptive and explicative, and does not contribute to normative de-
bates on how far a company’s supply chain responsibility should reach (e.g., Amaeshi, Osuji, 
and Nnodim 2008). However, our findings hold important implications for policy makers and 
managers once they have normatively defined the reach of the supply chain responsibility. 
Sixth, our research points to a need to further investigate industry specific differences of CSR 
orientation and power distribution. Such an analysis could contribute to more targeted policy 
making, aiming to ensure sustainable business practices in those industries in which the conven-
tional and extended chain of CSR enforcement are more likely to fail. 
Seventh and finally, as mentioned previously we cannot fully rule out a selection effect in Study 
1. Thus, future research should more explicitly ask customer firms whether their selection of the 
focal supplier was based on this supplier’s CSR engagement. By excluding customer firms who 
based their selection of a supplier on this supplier’s CSR engagement, future studies may carve 
out the extended chain of CSR enforcement more rigorously.  
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TABLE 1: STUDY 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
Variable V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 
V1: Customer CSR orientation            
V2: Customer exerted CSR pressure .74***           
V3: Supplier CSR engagement .18** .17**          
V4: Supplier CSR reputation .25*** .27*** .14**         
V5: Supplier competitive intensity -.03 .02 -.08 .05        
V6: Relative customer firm size .13* .09 -.12* -.11 -.04       
V7: Supplier product commoditization .07 -.02 .02 .04 .01 -.13*      
V8: Extrinsic CSR attribution .08 .14** .06 .31*** .14* -.03 .08     
V9: Length of relationship .22*** -.03 .12 -.03 -.01 -.01 .11 .12*    
V10: Customer risk mitigating supplier selection -.09 -.06 -.01 .20*** -.13* -.10 -.04 -.01 -.20***   
V11: Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing .67*** .69*** -.13* .29*** -.01 .05 .05 .23*** .07 -.10  
M 4.94 4.22 5.14 4.85 4.35 -.85 3.15 3.98 14.86 4.69 5.16 
SD 1.29 1.48 1.04 1.12 1.33 2.02 1.77 1.31 11.88 1.99 1.22 
Α .92 .89 .87 .91 .90 ―a .93 .88 ―a ―a ―a 
AVE .79 .76 .70 .78 .57 ―a .81 .74 ―a ―a ―a 
CR .92 .90 .88 .92 .84 ―a .93 .90 ―a ―a ―a 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
Note: M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, α = Cronbach’s alpha, AVE = Average Variance Extracted, CR = Composite Reliability, a = Single item 
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TABLE 2: STUDY 1: ESTIMATED PATH COEFFICIENTS 
Paths  
Model 1: 
Full Model 
Model 2: 
Conventional Chain 
Model 
Model 3: 
Robustness Check 
Conventional Chain of CSR Enforcement     
Customer CSR orientation  customer exerted CSR pressure  .78*** .78*** .55*** 
Customer exerted CSR pressure  supplier CSR engagement  .17** .16** .18* 
Extended Chain of CSR Enforcement     
Customer CSR orientation  supplier CSR engagement  .04n.s. — .03n.s. 
Customer CSR orientation  supplier competitive intensity  supplier CSR engagement H1a: + .16** — .16** 
Customer CSR orientation  relative customer firm size  supplier CSR engagement H1b: + .18*** — .18*** 
Customer CSR orientation  supplier product commoditization  supplier CSR engagement H1c: + .12** — .12** 
Outcomes of Supplier CSR Engagement     
Supplier CSR engagement  supplier CSR reputation  .08n.s. .08* .08n.s. 
Supplier CSR engagement  extrinsic CSR attribution  supplier CSR reputation H4: + -.13** -.12** -.11** 
Main Effects of Moderators     
Supplier competitive intensity  supplier CSR engagement  -.10* — -.10* 
Relative customer firm size  supplier CSR engagement  -.19*** — -.19*** 
Supplier product commoditization  supplier CSR engagement  -.04n.s. — -.04n.s. 
Extrinsic CSR attribution  supplier CSR reputation  .28*** .27*** .25*** 
Controlled Paths     
Customer CSR orientation  supplier CSR reputation  .21** .17* .14n.s. 
Customer exerted CSR pressure  supplier CSR reputation  .09n.s. .11n.s. .06n.s. 
Length of relationship  customer exerted CSR pressure  -.21*** -.19*** -.19*** 
Length of relationship  supplier CSR engagement  .17** .15** .17** 
Length of relationship  supplier CSR reputation  -.12** -.10* -.11** 
Customer risk mitigating supplier selection  customer exerted CSR pressure  — — -.00n.s. 
Customer risk mitigating supplier selection  supplier CSR engagement  — — .01n.s. 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing  customer exerted CSR pressure  — — .34*** 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing   supplier CSR engagement  — — -.01n.s. 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing   supplier CSR reputation  — — .11n.s. 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing  length of relationship   customer exerted CSR pressure  — — .04n.s. 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing  length of relationship  supplier CSR engagement  — — -.05n.s. 
Customer increasing importance of CSR in purchasing  length of relationship   supplier CSR reputation  — — -.11* 
Model Fit Indices     
Comparative fit index (CFI)  1.00 1.00 .98 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)  1.00 .99 .95 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .00 .03 .04 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR)  .02 .02 .02 
χ2 (d.f.)  15.19 (16) 5.59 (5) 21.56 (17) 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)  1604.83 1653.35 1586.81 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)  1679.14 1705.47 1686.98 
n.s. p > .10, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Notes: We report standardized coefficients.  
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TABLE 3: STUDY 1: RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE CONVENTIONAL AND THE EXTENDED CHAIN OF CSR EN-
FORCEMENT 
Moderator Levels Conventional Chain Extended Chain Overall Mechanism 
Supplier Competi-
tive Intensity 
Relative Customer 
Firm Size 
Supplier Product 
Commoditization 
Indirect Effect: 
Customer CSR Orientation 
 Exerted CSR Pressure 
 Supplier CSR Engagement 
Conditional Direct Effect: 
Customer CSR Orientation 
 Supplier CSR Engagement 
Total Effect: 
Indirect Effect  
+ Conditional Direct Effect 
Medium Medium Medium .14** .04n.s. .17*** 
High Medium Medium .14** .16* .30*** 
Medium High Medium .14** .12n.s. .25*** 
Medium Medium High .14** .11n.s. .25*** 
High High Medium .14** .25** .38*** 
High Medium High .14** .24** .38*** 
Medium High High .14** .19* .33*** 
High High High .14** .32*** .46*** 
n.s. p > .10, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Notes: We report standardized coefficients. A high level of a moderator was set to 1 (note that all indicators were previously z-transformed). 
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TABLE 4: STUDY 2: ESTIMATED PATH COEFFICIENTS 
Measurement of Supplier Perceived CSR Pressure (1) Based On Unsworth et al. (2012) (2) Own Operationalization 
Paths  
Model 1a: 
Full Sample 
Model 1b: 
Robustness Sample 
Model 2a: 
Full Sample 
Model 2b: 
Robustness Sample 
Main Effects      
Customer CSR orientation  supplier perceived CSR pressure  .40*** .39*** -.06n.s. -.08n.s. 
Supplier perceived CSR pressure  supplier CSR intention H3: + .24*** .27*** .31*** .36*** 
      
Interaction Effect      
Customer CSR orientation  customer power   supplier perceived CSR pressure H2: + .32*** .29*** .22** .27** 
      
Main Effect of Moderator      
Customer power  supplier perceived CSR pressure  -.07n.s. -.08n.s. -.11n.s. -.10n.s. 
      
Controlled Paths      
Attitude toward CSR  supplier perceived CSR pressure  .04n.s. .06n.s. .19*** .22*** 
Attitude toward CSR  supplier CSR intention  .42*** .43*** .36*** .35*** 
Employer CSR engagement  supplier perceived CSR pressure  .08n.s. .07n.s. -.01n.s. -.00n.s. 
Employer CSR engagement  supplier CSR intention  .24*** .19*** .26*** .20*** 
Model Fit Indices      
Comparative fit index (CFI)  1.00 1.00 1.00 .99 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)  1.00 1.00 1.00 .96 
Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .00 .00 .01 .04 
Standardized root mean square residual (SRMR)  .01 .01 .02 .02 
χ2 (d.f.)  .76 (3) .72 (3) 3.10 (3) 3.78 (3) 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)  1771.47 1571.55 1077.81 945.49 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)  1809.03 1607.60 1115.22 981.38 
n.s. p > .10, * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (one-tailed) 
Notes: We report standardized coefficients. 
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Figure 1 
CSR Enforcement in B2B Supply Chains 
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Figure 2 
Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 3 
Study 2: Supplier Perceived CSR Pressure 
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